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STATE SALES AND USE TAXATION IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
CONGRESS MAKES SOME SUGGESTIONS
This note examines critically the recommendations of the Spe-
cial Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on State
Sales and Use Taxation, and the resultant bill proposed to Con-
gress.
INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT publication of a special congressional Subcommittee's
report' on state taxation of interstate commerce has provided Con-
gress with an opportunity to alleviate the state tax problems of the
multistate seller. Such action will be especially welcome in the area
of sales and use taxation, where diversity of state law has long en-
cumbered interstate transactions. 2 The subcommittee report pro-
' Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Inter-
state Commerce, H.R. REP. Nos. 565, 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Volumes three
and four constitute the final two of a full four-volume report. The latter two volumes
deal with sales and use taxation and the recommendations of the Subcommittee, and are
focal to this note. The first two volumes were released in 1962 and deal with state
income taxation.
The report was authorized by Act of Sept. 14, 1959 (Pub. L. No. 86-272) 73 Stat.
555, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964), which was passed several months after the controversial
decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). In that decision the Supreme Court held that Minnesota could enforce a state
income tax upon the net proceeds of' a foreign corporation which maintained a sales
office within the state, but had no other contact within Minnesota. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter dissented from the majority decision on the grounds that it was not the
function of the Court to make the detailed study necessary to determine the burden
of multistate taxation upon the interstate seller and thereupon balance that burden
against the necessities of national economic life. Seemingly acting in response to Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent, Congress passed the Act of Sept. 14, 1959, which ex-
cluded from state income tax jurisdiction situations involving mere solicitation of
orders to be accepted at an out-of-state office. The law also authorized Congress to
commence a study of the whole field of state taxation of interstate business. 73 Stat.
555, 556 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964). Compare Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, supra at 474-76 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), with Special Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R.
REP. No. 952, supra at 1121-28 [hereinafter cited as 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952].
2The sales tax is a general tax measured by the sale price, applying at a single
rate to a broad variety of goods and services. The use tax, similar in effect and cover-
age, is a tax measured at a single rate based upon the sale price, but is imposed on
the use, storage or consumption of the product within the taxing jurisdiction. The
sales tax is based on the act of sale. The use tax normally exempts goods subject to a
sales tax within the taxing jurisdiction and ordinarily falls upon goods sold out-of-state
and transported to the taxing jurisdiction. In effect, the two taxes thus act as a single
tax scheme. Since the focus of the report is upon the problems created by the require-
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poses to solve the diversity problem in the sales and use tax area by
creating a system of uniform laws voluntarily enacted by each state
and centrally administered by the Treasury Department.3
In order to establish this system, the Subcommittee recom-
mended that Congress limit the noncomplying state's jurisdiction
to enforce collection of sales and use taxes to situations where the
multistate seller maintains a substantial presence within the bound-
aries of the state.4 Thus, the report contemplates that only sellers
who maintain real estate holdings, make regular delivery of goods
or have an employee operating entirely within the state may be re-
quired to collect and pay state sales and use taxes.3 However, for
those states enacting the model law, such jurisdictional limitations
would not apply; rather, collection responsibility for sales into
enacting states will be nation-wide. Further, the proposed model
law provides a uniform tax base and uniform procedures and re-
ments that the seller comply with a multiplicity of rules and regulations, it would
seem that the source of those problems is the use tax, which allows a number of states
to tax the same seller. See Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 607,
613-14 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 565].
Problems in the sales and use tax area had their roots in the Depression, when the
states turned to a regressive tax to bolster flagging revenues. Id. at 609. Throughout
the early period of the tax the states feared that the commerce clause precluded a
sales tax on interstate business, and therefore applied the tax only to local sales. Id.
at 613. This created the problem of protecting intrastate business from unfair com-
petition with interstate business which was free from the state sales tax burden. Dis.
crimination against local business caused so much concern that serious efforts to effect
federal legislation in the area were ended only by the appearance of the use tax,
which enabled the states to enact a comprehensive tax system affecting both interstate
and intrastate business. Id. at 613-14; Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce,
9 VAND. L. REv. 138, 164-66 (1956). At this point the focus of the problem shifted from
the state to the seller-collector, since a concurrent relaxation of jurisdictional due process
impediments upon the state created uncertainty as to the extent which a state could
exercise jurisdiction over the multistate seller. See 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 565, at
745-54.
'1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952, at 1133-38.
'Id. at 1180.
'Ibid.
A state within the collective system will have jurisdiction, bestowed by Congress,
to enforce collection of a use tax by the seller of the goods without regard to physical
or legal presence, domicile or contact. The one exception to this rule of nation-wide
collection responsibility will be the small firm handling prepaid mail order sales.
These sellers would not be required to collect taxes on sales attributable to any state
in which only prepaid mail sales are made and the seller carries on no activity in the
state other than advertising. The Subcommittee stated that the firm which handles
prepaid mail orders has no effective way of collecting the tax from its customers, and
therefore any collection responsibility would impose the tax upon the collector and
not the customer. Moreover, the aggregate sales of such firms are not large. Id. at
1181-82.
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quirements for filing which the Subcommittee feels will solve the
diversity problem confronting the interstate seller.7
In late October 1965, in response to the Subcommittee's recom-
mendations, H.R. 11798 was submitted to the Congress.8 The bill
contains the provisions for a uniform state tax system relating to
interstate commerce.9 The section specifically dealing with the sales
and use taxation contains a uniform law for adoption by the states
on a voluntary basis.' 0 By containing provisions creating a uniform
tax base and filing procedures and requirements, the uniform law
presented in the bill carries out the proposals of the Subcommittee.
In rendering the general recommendations into specific legislative
proposals, the bill has in some instances resolved the problems sug-
gested by the recommendations. In other instances, however, it has
left them unchanged, or clouded even further.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
This suggested legislative course creates a number of new
problems. Several of these are of a constitutional nature arising from
the commerce and due process clauses..
A. Commerce Clause
Congress is given the power by the Constitution to regulate com-
merce among the several states.12 This power has been held to be
I1d. at 1181-87.
The subcommittee report envisions a uniform definition of "sale at retail" and
contemplates that variations in the taxability of goods be limited only to the optional
inclusion or exclusion of food and prescription drugs in the tax scheme of each state.
Id. at 1183-84. This means that every saleable item except food and drugs would be
subject to sales and use tax in states within the system. Such uniformity would alleviate
the seller's burden of determining, for each state within which he sells, exactly which
goods make up the tax base and are therefore subject to the sales and use tax. It does
appear, however, that the seller would still be subjected to different tax rates on sales
into different states. The report made no allusion to uniform rates, and thus has pre-
sumably left this determination to the individual states. This variance, while incon-
sistent with the goal of uniformity, may have been dictated by political exigency and
does not detract from the benefits of a uniform collection structure.
8 State Tax Rev., Oct. 27, 1965, p. 1.
9 See text of H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in State Tax Rev.,
Oct. 27, 1965.
10 H.R. 11798, 89th Gong., 1st Sess. § 322 (1965), reprinted in State Tax Rev.,
Oct. 27, 1965, pp. 34-40.
"ISince H.R. 11798, 89th Gong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1965), contains the jurisdictional
requirements proposed by the Subcommittee's recommendations, see note 6 supra
and accompanying text, the constitutional problems suggested will remain unchanged.
See State Tax Rev., Oct. 27, 1965, p. 2.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (8).
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exclusive where state regulation would tend to place any direct re-
strictions or other burdens upon the flow of goods through the
national market.13 Where such is not the case, the states are left
to their own designs until Congress speaks, after which they must
yield to the congressional action where the two are in conflict. 14 Al-
though the regulation of interstate commerce falls within the ex-
clusive power of Congress, the states are allowed to exercise their sep-
arate powers, even where that exercise tends to affect interstate com-
merce,1 5 so long as that commerce is not subjected to discriminatory'
23 Where Congress does not make express regulations in an area of exclusive au-
thority, state regulation has been deemed repugnant to the congressional implication
that the area is to be left free from all regulation. Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 630-31
(1885); Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279-80 (1872). Those
subjects of the commerce power which are in their nature national or admit only of
one uniform system or regulation may be said to be of such nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress. Cooley v. Board of Wardens ex rel. Society for the
Relief of Distressed Pilots, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (dictum). See also
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1946), where the limitation upon the states
was delimited by a balancing of the interest in freedom of unimpeded national
commerce and the local interest in regulation. "To leave the matter to Congress
allowing . . . [the] states to tax 'to the fullest extent' until it intervenes, would run
counter not only to the long-established rules requiring apportionment where inci-
dence of multiple taxes would be likely, but also in substance and effect [run
counter] to those forbidding discrimination, without the consent of Congress . . . as
well as the long-settled rule that the clause is 'of its own force' a prohibition upon
the states." Id. at 279 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
1I Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885) (Louisiana tax on goods as stock in
trade upheld as applied to coal sold while moored on the Mississippi); Gwin, White
& Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 455 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting); J. D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, ex rel. Society for the Relief of Distressed Pilots, supra note 13, at
319 (dictum). Cf. Freeman v. Hewit, supra note 13, at 279; Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275, 282 (1875) (license tax case indicating that congressional intention may be
implied from legislation in other fields).
I 0 lnsofar as the exercise of state power affects interstate commerce in a situation
where Congress has not acted to preempt the field, the court will balance local needs
against the requirement of a nation-wide free market; and the type of power exercised
by the state is an important factor in that balance. The taxing power is more nar-
rowly limited because of its more threatening potential as a power to destroy. Free-
man v. Hewit, supra note 13, at 252-53; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 431 (1819); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48
(1940) (dictum). Cf. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). For a gen-
eral treatment of state taxing power as applied to interstate commerce, see Hartman,
supra note 2, at 138; Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 46 VA. L. RaV.
1290 (1960); Menard, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: From Form to Substance
and Back Again, 18 Osno ST. L.J. 9 (1957); Sinon, How Can the States Tax Interstate
Commerce?, 32 TAXES 914 (1954).
10 A state regulation may discriminate either by providing a direct commercial ad-
vantage to local business or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of mul-
tiple taxation. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
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or undue burdens.'7 Determining the extent of allowable state ac-
tivity has been a function of the Supreme Court in the utilization of
its power to construe the commerce clause.' In the area of state
taxation, the Court has declared that the commerce clause is not a
vehicle for relief of the multistate business from its share of state
tax burdens. 9 Only where the taxing power of the state imposes
multiple20 or discriminatory2 l burdens on interstate commerce has
it been held to conflict with the commerce clause. Where the tax
is indirect, based upon some local incident, the Court has upheld
it. 22 The Court has declared the use within the state after the
458, 464 (1959) (apportioned tax on net income earned in state by foreign corporation
upheld); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 35, 38 (1944) (use tax
upon sales solicited by salesmen, accepted by vendor out-of-state and sent to buyer
by mail or common carrier upheld); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 805
U.S. 434, 438-39 (1939) (tax of 5% of gross receipts from marketing fruit shipped
out-of-state unconstitutional); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 630 (1885) (property
tax upon parish property upheld as applied to coal imported by river barge). Cf.
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 15, at 66-67 (Hughes, C. J.,
dissenting). In the latter case, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes argued that "it would seem
to be extraordinary if a State could escape the restriction against direct impositions
upon interstate commerce by first laying exactions upon its own trade and then
insisting that in order to make its local policy completely effective it must be allowed
to lay similar exactions upon interstate trade. That would apparently afford a simple
method for extending state power into what has hitherto been regarded as a for-
bidden field." Ibid.
17 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, supra note 16, at 435, 439-40; Mona-
motor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1934); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State
Bd. of Taxes and Assessments, 280 U.S. 338 (1930). See Freeman v. Hewit, 829 U.S.
249, 270-72 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). See note 15 supra for an indication of
the balancing test applied by the Court to determine the weight of the burden on in-
terstate commerce.
118See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); Freeman v.
Hewit, supra note 17, at 279 (Rutledge, J., concurring); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mc-
Goldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 69 (1940) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting).
'0 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 18, at 461-62;
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 18, at 46, 49; Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
20 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1949); Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, supra note 19, at 255-56 (dictum). See J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938). A multiple burden is the possibility that more than
one state may, with equal right, impose similar levies upon the same article. Michi-
gan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, supra at 166.
21 See note 16 supra.
22 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 178 (1939); cf. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
270 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 855 (1944)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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property is at rest to be such an incident, making the use tax a
permissible subject of state action.23
Legislation along the line suggested by the Subcommittee's
recommendation might be subject to attack by arguments similar
to those interposed recently against the Act of September 14, 1959
(Pub. L. No. 86-272), the federal statute which froze state juris-
diction to collect income taxes from multistate business to certain
situations involving minimal contacts while the Subcommittee's
study was being made.24 The basic tenet of these prospective at-
tacks may be hypothetically constructed as follows: the Supreme
Court has effectively exempted the use tax from the strictures of
the commerce clause by its holdings that such taxes do not burden
interstate commerce since they are imposed on property only after
it has come to rest in the state of use.2 5 The argument further con-
tends that since states have the power to tax except where taxation
interferes with an exclusive area of congresional jurisdiction such
as regulation of interstate commerce, 26 the power cannot constitu-
tionally be taken away where there is no conflict.2 7 The Supreme
23 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tar-
rant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 806 U.S. 62 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, supra
note 22; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
24 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964); see note 1 supra. There have been
three recent attacks on the constitutionality of this act in the state courts: International
Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964);
State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645
(Mo. 1964); Smith Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 403 P.2d 375 (Ore.
1965). In each instance the state court rendered judgment for the taxpayer by up-
holding the constitutionality of the act.
25 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tar-
rant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S.
167 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); see note 23 supra
and accompanying text.
The cases cited in note 24 supra deal with the Act of Sept. 14, 1959 (Pub. L. No.
86-272), 73 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964), which was designed solely to freeze state
income tax jurisdiction. The rationale behind the cases in the income tax area is
very similar to that used in the sales and use tax field. Both types of tax have been
judicially determined not to be regulations of interstate commerce of the type denied
to the states in the absence of congressional action. Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (income tax); Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., supra (use tax). There does not appear to be any substantial distinction
between the income tax and sales and use taxes which would affect this type of
argument, since all have been found to be local incidents. See Michigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954).
2'0 See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
2TSee International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 261, 164 So. 2d 314, 320,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964) (conflict did exist); State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645, 656 (Mo. 1964) (same); Taylor,
House Study Finds State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Burdensome and Unfair,
21 J. TAXAioN 120, 123 (1964).
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Court has previously found that no conflict exists in the sales and use
tax situation,28 and thus Congress arguably is precluded from over-
ruling such determinations.
A persuasive counterargument may be interposed to the above
contentions, however. It may be asserted that these determinations
by the Court have been mere constitutional delimitations defining a
field of permissive state action.29 Viewed in this perspective, sales
and use taxation of multistate business is an "overlap zone" of com-
merce regulation where states can act in the absence of congres-
sional action. 30 Supreme Court decisions have merely defined the
constitutionally permissive limits of state action where Congress has
not yet exercised its delegated power.31 Where the power delegated
is exercised by Congress, the Court's prior decisions are thus im-
material,3 2 for by that exercise Congress itself permissibly defines the
limits of state power. This view seems more consistent with the
reasoning used by the Court to justify its limitations upon state
taxation of interstate commerce. 33 Moreover, this argument appears
more compatible with the Court's permissive attitude toward con-
gressional utilization of the commerce clause to effectuate national
policies.3 4 Thus, an attack predicated upon the commerce clause
is unlikely to thwart the proposed system or pose a significant threat
to its validity.
B. Due Process
The second possible constitutional issue will likely arise in a due
process context.38 Discussion in this area will probably be directed
28 See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954);
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 178 (1939).
20 See Taylor, supra note 27, at 123.
80 Cf. Smith Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 403 P.2d 375, 379 (Ore.
1965).
""E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959).
32 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-90 (1938);
International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, 320, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 902 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441 (1939).
04 This permissive attitude seems to be expressed in a series of cases, culminating in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
5 For a discussion of the role of due process in sales and use taxation see generally
Hartman, supra note 2, at 171-76; Kust & Sales, supra note 15, at 1803-09; 1965 Special
Subcomm. No. 565, at 626-27.
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at the proposed jurisdictional limitations imposed upon states that
do not enact the suggested model law. 6 Under present judicial de-
cisions, the due process limitation on state jurisdiction to enforce
legal obligations is determined by a consideration of the relevant
factors involved in the case in light of "our traditional conception
of fair play and substantial justice." 37 A number of recent cases
have given some indication of the application of this subjective
standard in the use tax field. In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,38 the
Supreme Court found insufficient contact"0 to justify assertion of
use tax jurisdiction by Maryland where a Delaware seller sold across-
the-counter to Maryland residents and advertised only through Dela-
ware radio and newspapers and by mail circulars to former customers,
some of whom were residents of Maryland. The seller did, however,
make deliveries into Maryland. 40 Giving the opinion of the Court,
Mr. Justice Jackson alluded to the seller's difficulty in determining
whether the taxable goods were to be used in Maryland. 41 He also
mentioned the seller's freedom from Maryland's sales tax and stated
that since the use tax is imposed upon the purchaser, "it would be a
strange law that would make the taxpayer [seller] more vulnerable
to liability for another's tax than to a tax on itself."42 The Court
thus found no jurisdictional basis in the facts of Miller Bros. upon
which the state could enforce its use tax against the out-of-state
seller.43 In a later case, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,44 a variance in the
facts was deemed sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the tax.
The Court found sufficient contact to hold a Georgia seller liable
for the Florida use tax where sales were solicited in Florida through
resident brokers working on a commission basis. The orders were
then forwarded to the out-of-state offices for acceptance and ship-
80 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
37 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 810, 820 (1945).
-8 847 U.S. 840 (1954).
88 Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, indicated that "due process requires
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax." Id. at 844-45. He did not, however, delineate any
criterion for determining that minimum connection.
" Id. at 841.
41 Id. at 844.
,Id. at 846.
,Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized what may have been a major factor in the Court's
decision: "Here was no invasion or exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland."
Id. at 347. Without such a purposeful exploitation by the seller, the Court obviously
felt it unfair to make the seller undertake duties which he would not otherwise have to
accept.
"862 U.S. 207 (1960).
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ment.45 The Court pointed out that the Florida tax was nondis-
criminatory and that the taxpayer had ten resident jobbers soliciting
in Florida on a commission basis.46 Given these findings, the Court
pointed out that the collection of use tax by the out-of-state seller
"'is a familiar and sanctioned device' and . . .Florida reimburses
appellant for its service in this regard." 47
By contrast, under the proposed legislation, a seller operating
within the factual setting in Miller Bros. would be taxable by states
outside the system; for by making regular deliveries into Mary-
land, the seller has manifested that "substantial presence" which
the report deemed sufficient to justify the invocation of jurisdiction
by outsiders.4 No tax could be levied by an outsider in the Scripto
situation, however, for the report does not contemplate the asser-
tion of jurisdiction by a nonparticipating state where the seller has
no property within the state, makes no regular deliveries there and
maintains no employees solely within that state.49 In so limiting the
jurisdiction of the states outside the proposed system, Congress
may be faced with the argument that such a limitation is an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of the judicial function of determining the
jurisdictional limits in light of the constitutional restrictions in-
herent in the due process clause. This type of attack was made
against the Act of September 14, 1959 (Pub. L. No. 86-272),50 in
several recent state cases.51 The Oregon court rejected the argu-
ment, stating that Congress by its action had not violated either
the separation of powers doctrine or the due process clause.5 2  The
"rId. at 209-10.
"OId. at 211. Mr. Justice Clark indicates that these factors are sufficient to supply
the "'definite link . .. [the] minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property, or transaction it seeks to tax,'" id. at 210-11, quoting from Miller Bros.,
which was missing from the Miller Bros. situation.
"7Id. at 212. It appears that the Court here is referring to a practice indulged in
by many states wherein a percentage discount is allowed the seller on taxes due to the
states. Generally this amount will total two or three percent of the taxes collected. See
1965 Special Subcomm. No. 565, at 701-02.
"s 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952, at 1180.
49 Ibid.
"D 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964). See note 1 supra.
0' State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 882 S.W.2d
645, 654 (Mo. 1964); Smith Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 403 P.2d 375,
378 (Ore. 1965).
" Ibid. The Missouri court dealt with a similar line of argument, dismissing it
with the short statement that "we do not find that the act overrules any U.S. Court
decisions, since Congress and the Courts operate in different fields." State ex rel.
CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra note 51, at 667. The
import of this assertion appears to be similar in meaning to the language of the
Oregon court.
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Court proceeded to express the view that Congress, in limiting state
jurisdiction to less than that allowed by the Supreme Court's delimi-
tation of jurisdictional power under the due process clause, had not
attempted to alter the Court's interpretation of due process. Rather,
the Oregon court merely characterized the statute as a legislative
determination that the states may not exercise the total jurisdictional
reach allowed them by the due process clause and still remain within
their allowable limits under the commerce clause as implemented
by Congress.53 Although decisions in the state courts may thus be
deemed both persuasive and favorable to the proposed law, until
the issue is decided by the Supreme Court it will remain an area
of uncertainty to the tax bar and the multistate seller.6
4
A second problem which may arise under the due process clause
is that of congressonal power to expand the state jurisdictional reach
into areas that the Supreme Court has held to exceed the permissible
" Mr. Justice Denecke in speaking for the Supreme Court of Oregon, stated that
"we find the congressional action not to violate the doctrine of separation of powers
or the Due Process Clause. The minimum contacts for jurisdictional nexus have not
been changed by P.L. 86-272 [Act of September 14, 1959]. Congress cannot change the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. Instead, Congress has found that it is wise
.. to limit state taxation of interstate commerce. The Congress has the power under
the Commerce Clause, to remove or alleviate state-imposed burdens on interstate
commerce. The boundaries of the federal commerce power do not coincide with the
due process limits of state taxing power. Instead, the two powers overlap, and in
the area of concurrence, the states may act unless Congress specifically prohibits." Smith
Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra note 51, at 378.
Mr. Justice Denecke's statement seems to deal exclusively with congressional action
in limiting state jurisdiction. States outside the system may also attempt to attack
the proposed statute by interposing the argument that the legislation changes the Court's
construction of the due process clause to the detriment of many taxpayers by ex-
panding the jurisdictional limits of the states within the system. The arguments advo-
cated by the state courts in Smith and CIBA will not be sufficient to dispose of this
contention, for it is clear that extending the jurisdiction of the system does not have
an effect upon the relationship between due process and jurisdictional nexus. The
problem may be resolved by forbidding the states to argue the rights of their citizen-
taxpayers for lack of standing under the theory of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923). This would not dispose of the argument but would lessen the sources
of attack.
" The due process problem has not come before the Court in this context in any
prior case, for Congress has never passed legislation redefining the scope of judicial
demarcations of the requisites of due process. See State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645, 654 (Mo. 1964). The interest of
the tax bar and the administrators is indicated by the number of amici curiae briefs
filed in the three state court cases. In CIBA, three states filed amici curiae briefs
opting for the invalidity of the Act of September 14, 1959 (Pub. L. No. 86-272). Ibid.
Twelve states filed such briefs in Smith Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n,
supra note 51, and three taxpayers interposed briefs in favor of the legislation. Id.
at 375-76. Similarly, nineteen states and two taxpayer representatives filed as antici
curiae in International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 248, 164 So. 2d 314, 316,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964).
[Vol. 1966: 599
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
limits of due process. The subcommittee recommendations permit
complying states to exercise jurisdiction under circumstances found
by the court in Miller Bros. not to provide the requisite fairness.55
It is to be anticipated that a taxpayer might challenge such an ex-
tension, relying on arguments .similar to those above-that Congress
is exercising a judicial function by defining the limits of due process
and contravening prior Supreme Court determinations of those
limitations. Here, Congress would be specifically contradicting a
decision as to the limits of fairness which the due process clause per-
mits. In order to uphold the proposed legislation, however, the
Court may rely on the subjective nature of the balancing test under
the due process clause and distinguish Miller Bros. on grounds that
congressional action would be a -determinative factor not present
in the Miller Bros. situation. Such a holding would be predicated
upon the reasoning that the existence of congressional action in
simplifying and consolidating jurisdiction and tax bases along the
lines proposed would be the added factor needed to tip the scales
of fairness in favor of state collection of the use tax in a situation
like Miller Bros. Thus, the "fair play and substantial justice"' 56
standard would not be changed under the circumstances. Only the
circumstances would be changed.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the constitutional problems presented by the rec-
ommended legislation, a number of pragmatic problems present
themselves. Within the proposed law, the Subcommittee envisions
a discretionary power in the states to exempt certain uses and pur-
chasers. 57 There are two methods of effecting this discretion. The
first is to exempt the purchaser from having to pay the tax to the
" In Miller Bros. the Court found no justification for jurisdiction under the
due process clause where the seller sold across-the-counter to Maryland customers
at its store in Delaware and had no contact in Maryland except regular deliveries by
the store's own trucks. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text. The recom-
mendations state ihat "a state may not require a seller to collect a sales or use tax
unless the seller: . . . (3) regularly uses his own vehicles or a private parcel service
to make deliveries to private residences in the State." 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952,
at 1136.
:0 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
7 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952, at 1183-84. The Subcommittee did not enumerate
its reasons for according the states this latitude to grant exemptions, although it
ostensibly is designed to allow for variances in state economic policies. Exemption
guidelines are not provided by the Subcommittee, leaving the states to act wholly
within their own discretion.
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seller. If this method is followed, the present problems of a seller
with a multiplicity of exemptions are not eliminated, but are grafted
onto the new system.58 The alternative is to require the purchaser
to pay the tax to the seller, who remits to the state, which may
then grant a refund to the purchaser."9 The seller would then have
no problem with varying state exemptions and each state would only
enforce one set of laws, designed to carry out its economic and social
policies. The state might, however, tie up some revenue in floating
funds to cover anticipated refunds, although remission to the pur-
chasers directly from the federal treasury would alleviate this burden
somewhat. 60
The legislation proposed by H.R. 11798 approaches this prob-
lem by providing a discretion in the state of passing legislation grant-
ing immunity from the taxes through tax refunds by the states or im-
munity numbers. 61 In the case of the tax refund system, it appears
that the state will bear the administrative burden of the program.
58 For a general treatment of collector problems with exemptions on a multistate
level, see 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 565, at 649-53, 685-87. The problem generally
is that the seller must make allowances for exemptions in collecting the tax from his
customers. Since the exemptions vary from state to state, depending upon the eco-
nomic policies which they pursue, a seller must vary his collection of sales and use
taxes accordingly. As the number of states within which the seller operates increases,
his exemption problems multiply commensurately.
rg There is some indication in the report that this is the method favored by the
Subcommittee. The body of the recommendations for sales and use taxes contains
only a general, ambiguous statement that "it appears practicable to leave room for a
diversity of state views as to exempt purchasers and exempt uses of goods while at
the same time eliminating the problems they have created for interstate sellers. The
approach recommended is to absolve the seller of responsibility for any collection
from buyers entitled to such exemptions.
"When it comes to the exemption of particular types of goods, however, a diversity
of provisions among the states is incompatible with a workable cooperatively ad-
ministered system." 1965 Special Subcomm. No. 952, at 1184. Taking the first and
second paragraphs as a composite, it is unclear whether the Subcommittee favors
exemptions in the collection process or refunds subsequent to collection. In its sum-
mary of the recommendations, the Subcommittee gave a further indication of its
intentions. There it was stated that "no goods will be exempt, although each state
will be free to grant refunds to purchasers." Id. at 1137. Seemingly, this statement
indicates that the Subcommittee envisions uniform collection requirements with a
power in the individual states to grant refunds to carry out particularized state
economic policies.
60 Administration of refunds directly from the Treasury would free state revenue,
but at the same time increase the administrative costs for which the state must
recompense the Treasury. Under either method of refunding, exempted business
funds are placed in temporary limbo. The anticipated problems will be lessened in
the case of the recurrent buyer with a relatively stable refund. After the first year,
accounting procedures will offset the amount of tax paid against the amount refunded
to arrive at a static figure.
01 H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1) (1965), reprinted in State Tax Rev.,
Oct. 27, 1965, pp. 32-33.
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In such a case, the problem of revenue allocation would still be
facing the state.62  The immunity numbers, however, would be
administered by the Treasury Department. 63 Although it is not
clear, the impression given by the uniform law suggested by H.R.
11798 is that the seller will be released from his collection duty if
the purchaser presents his immunity number.64 Apparently, the risk
of tax loss through false immunity numbers falls upon the state.
If such is the case, the present problems that the seller has with
exceptions65 would be solved. If not, however, those problems would
still be with us. The solution to this decision lies entirely with the
court.
The multistate seller will still have to cope with variances in
filing requirements and tax base determinations between states
outside the system and between in-system and out-system states.
The hardship that these variances will cause the seller depends
upon the number of states that remain outside the system. This
suggests another problem confronting Congress. If the system is
to work it must be attractive to a majority of states employing sales
and use taxes, for its effectiveness lies in voluntary action by the
states in enacting the model code and thus consolidating many
statutes into one. Although there are cost and revenue advantages
in a uniform administration,66 the main factor which will invite
compliance is the jurisdictional restriction imposed upon the states
outside the system. As indicated, there is a possibility that the
limitation may encounter constitutional emasculation. If so, the
system may well have no persuasive reason for joining it. Al-
though such a judicial reaction does not seem likely, it will provide
reluctant states with a rationale for inaction until set to rest by the
courts.
02 The bill does not specifically provide for the administration of the refund system,
although it does for the immunity number system. See note 63 infra and accompanying
text. It is thus concluded that it is the states who are to administer the refunds.
For the problems the states would encounter in administering such a system, see
note 60 supra and accompanying text.
63 H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 309 (d) (2) (1965), reprinted in State Tax Rev.,
Oct. 27, 1965, pp. 23-24.
0, See UNIFORM SALES AND USE TAx LAW §§ 3-3, 4-4, reprinted in State Tax Rev.,
Oct. 27, 1965, pp. 38-39.
e" See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
For example, there will be an increase in state revenue from the occasional
sale by the small, non-complying seller who often does not attract the attention of
the state tax administrator and so escapes the collection responsibility. See 1965
Special Subcomm. No. 565, at 712.
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A widespread acceptance of the system will not ameliorate all
difficulties. Even though the model law adopted by the states will
create a uniform legislative tax scheme, it will be a state, not a
federal law. As such, individual state court decisions of each state
will be binding, even in the federal district courts."7 The result
might be diversity in application of the otherwise uniform act
since the courts of one state are not bound by the judicial interpre-
tation given a uniform act in courts of a sister state.68 Therefore,
although the legislation will be uniform, application of the law
may not be.69 Although this has not created insuperable problems
for the efficacy of other uniform laws,70 there are indications that the
state tax field is more susceptible to such disparate treatment by the
states. 7'
:7 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" There is some indication that at least some jurisdictions in this country give uni-
form effect to decisions of sister states construing uniform laws or model statutes. E.g.,
Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 284, 218 Pac. 959, 960 (1923); Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 309, 227 N.W. 387, 389 (1930). Other jurisdictions have
given great weight to decisions of sister states on such laws, but have stopped short of
according them controlling effect. E.g., Colley v. Summers Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va.
439, 445, 89 S.E. 906, 908 (1916). There is, however, no compulsion to construe such
acts uniformly. Although a state court has the responsibility of effectuating the de-
signs of the legislature which passed the model act, it would also seem to owe a duty
to the people of the state to act as a conservative influence in considering the interests
involved on the individual level. While the legislature may feel that uniformity is
desirable for some overall purpose, the court may have to deal with situations unique
to the jurisdiction. In such a situation, it is questionable whether a court should give
controlling weight to a decision rendered in another jurisdiction if it is to fulfill its
function as arbiter of the interests of the citizens of its own jurisdiction.
'9 The tax field would seem to be more conducive of litigation than most, since
both the taxpayer and the administrator are prone to litigate. Moreover, a system
of taxation which affects interstate commerce should be free from conflicting interpre.
tation.
7o See, e.g., the Uniform Principal and Income Act (1931, 1962 acts), effective in
twenty-three states; the Uniform Commercial Code (and its predecessor, the Uniform
Sales Act), effective in thirty-two states and territories; the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act (1950, 1952, 1958 acts), effective in fifty-three states and
territories. The widespread adoption of these acts over a period of years is not neces-
sarily testimony to the fact that the uniform acts have been ideal, as indicated by con-
stant revision. However, adoption by a substantial number of states does indicate that
the acts have been found to be desirable for some purposes.
71 See Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Com-
merce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1121, 1144-45 (1960), which points
out that the states have consistently failed to take the initiative in achieving uni-
formity in sales and use taxes. Since 1916 the National Tax Association has explored
remedies for the problem without success. A host of others have walked the same
barren path, including the National Association of Tax Administrators, the Con-
troller's Institute, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Id. at 1145.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the sales and use tax problem demands
solution. However, the legislation suggested by the Subcommittee
contains enough inherent problems to caution Congress to examine
the possible alternatives. One such alternative would be preemptive
federal legislation similar to the model law, replacing all state
sales and use taxes with one uniform scheme. This would effect
the desired uniformity and eliminate the problem of inconsistent
judicial interpretation.72 Any workable solution must ease the col-
lection burden of the interstate seller without exposing the state
taxing power to excessive federal control. If the Subcommittee's
recommendations are the best compromise in this respect, perhaps
they should be adopted in spite of their inherent difficulties. Never-
theless, in order to make the proposed system more attractive to the
states without lessening its effectiveness, Congress should take note
of these defects and consider possible alternatives to both the
system proposed by the report and a preemptive federal system.
Possible modifications of the proposed system include a single tax
court to administer the system and thus provide uniform interpre-
tation of the model act. Moreover, the Treasury's central admin-
istration should replace much of the states' own administration, or
bear the cost from some other source in order to make it economical
for the states to join. Pragmatically, the system must allow the
states to grant exemptions in order to further their own divergent
economic policies; yet, the exemptions must be administered in
such a manner that they will not destroy the uniformity of the
system. One answer is to allow rebates.73 Another possibility is a
federal law creating a standard tax and procedural base for sales
and use taxation of interstate commerce. The law would apply to
all states and would not rely upon voluntary compliance. It could
72 Having a single federal law in force in all fifty states with the consequent central
administration and universal jurisdiction would bring uniformity to the sales tax
field. Such a federal law would eliminate the problem of inconsistent judicial inter-
pretation since any variation among the lower federal courts could be resolved with
finality by appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
It might be possible to authorize a single court or judicial system to exercise
jurisdiction in tax cases involving the proposed uniform system suggested by the
Subcommittee. This would accomplish the same result as having a federal law, ad-
ministered by the federal court system, although the states would in all probability
be reluctant to surrender the authority of their judicial system to a superjudiciary.
73 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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allow each state to determine the percentage of the sales price
taxes74 and to allow rebates. In any case, feasible legislation must
create a balance between the local needs for revenue and economic
planning and the national need for a uniform system for ease in
administration.
71 Although a variance in percentage rates would make the system less than uni-
form, the consequent burden on the seller would not be of large magnitude. See
note 6 supra. On the other hand, requiring a uniform rate ignores possible variations
in state financial needs. Sales and use taxes are the major source of state revenue, and
must, therefore, be allowed to vary from state to state with the need for that
revenue.
